Insidious Discrimination? Disentangling the Beauty Premium on a Game Show

Michèle Belot (), V Bhaskar and Jeroen van de Ven ()

No 6276, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper analyzes behaviour on a TV game show where players' monetary payoffs depend upon an array of factors, including ability in answering questions, perceived cooperativeness and the willingness of other players to choose them. We find a substantial beauty premium and are able to disentangle contributing factors. Attractive players perform no differently from less attractive ones, on every dimension. They also exhibit and engender the same degree of cooperativeness. Nevertheless, attractive players are substantially less likely to be eliminated by their peers. Our results suggest a consumption value basis for the beauty premium, and it appears that this is a form of insidious discrimination.

Keywords: beauty premium; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D63 J15 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2007-04
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