Community and Class Antagonism

Indraneel Dasgupta () and Ravi Kanbur

No 6330, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We investigate how vertical unity within a community interacts with horizontal class divisions of an unequal income distribution. Community is conceptualized in terms of a public good to which all those in the community have equal access, but from which outsiders are excluded. We formulate the idea of redistributive tension, or class antagonism, in terms of the costs that poorer individuals would be willing to impose on the rich, to achieve a given gain in personal income. Our conclusion is that the nominal distribution of income could give a misleading picture of tensions in society, both within and across communities. Ideologies of community solidarity may well trump those of class solidarity because of the implicit sharing of community resources brought about by community-specific public goods. Greater economic mobility of particular types may actually exacerbate class tensions instead of attenuating them. We illustrate our theoretical results with a discussion of a number of historical episodes of shifting class tensions and alliances.

Keywords: Class Conflict; Community; Distribution; Ethnic Conflict; Inequality; Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D63 D74 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-soc
Date: 2007-06
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP6330.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Community and class antagonism (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6330

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP6330.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Series data maintained by ().