Recursive Global Games

Chryssi Giannitsarou () and Flavio Toxvaerd ()

No 6470, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The present paper contributes to the literature on dynamic games with strategic complementarities, in two interrelated ways. First, we identify a class of dynamic complete information games in which intertemporal complementarities and multiple equilibria can be fruitfully analyzed. Second, we extend the analysis to an incomplete information framework, where results from the literature on global games can be applied to select a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in monotone strategies.

Keywords: dynamic global games; Dynamic supermodular games; endogenous cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D43 E32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mac and nep-mic
Date: 2007-09
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Working Paper: Recursive global games (2004)
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