Multilateral Subsidy Games

Dermot Leahy () and J. Peter Neary ()

No 6479, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are "friendly", raising rival profits in total, and/or strategic complements, raising rival profits at the margin. In both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when spillovers are low and competition is intense (because goods are close substitutes), national-welfare-maximizing governments will over-subsidize investment, and banning subsidies would improve welfare. When spillovers are high, national governments under-subsidize from a global welfare perspective, but the subsidy game is welfare superior to non-intervention.

Keywords: Industrial policy; Investment subsidies; Oligopoly; R&D spillovers; Strategic trade policy; Subsidy wars (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2007-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: Multilateral Subsidy Games (2007)
Journal Article: Multilateral subsidy games (2009)
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