The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited

Pablo Brañas-Garza (), García-Muñoz, Teresa and Shoshana Neuman

No 6666, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).

Keywords: carrot/stick; Economics of Religion; high stakes; punishment; rewards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
Working Paper: The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (2008)
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