Job Search Monitoring and Unemployment Duration: Evidence from a Randomised Control Trial

John Micklewright () and Gyula Nagy

No 6711, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The administration of benefits is a relatively neglected aspect of the analysis of disincentive effects of unemployment benefit systems. We investigate this issue with a field experiment in Hungary involving random assignment of benefit claimants to treatment and control groups, a method of policy evaluation that is still rare in Europe. Treatment, involving a tightening of claim administration, has quite a large effect on durations on benefit of women aged 30 and over, while we find no effect for younger women or men.

Keywords: field experiment; Hungary; job search; unemployment insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 J65 P23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-lab
Date: 2008-02
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