National Insurance Against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union

Jacques Melitz and Silvia Vori

No 697, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We examine proposals to introduce in the European Community national insurance against unevenly distributed shocks. This would operate differently from tax and government spending activities that now yield regional insurance within countries, since the latter are mainly designed for other purposes such as income redistribution and general revenue-raising. According to our evidence, the appeal of such insurance is very limited because the risks are too highly correlated and there is an excessive chance that a country in difficulty would not receive aid. The costs of a continuing programme are likely to exceed the benefits.

Keywords: European Monetary Union; Fiscal Federalism; Regional Insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F41 F42 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP697.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:697

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP697.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Series data maintained by ().