Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect

Assaf Razin () and Edith Sand

No 7310, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The pay-as-you-go social security system, burdened by dwindling labour force, can benefit from immigrants, with birth rates that exceed the native-born birth rates. Thus, the social security system effectively provides an incentive to liberalize migration policy through a political-economy mechanism. The paper examines a dynamic political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young decisive voter's attitudes in favour of a more liberal immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social security consists of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with no social security.

Keywords: Demographic Imbalance; Pay-As-You-Go Social Security System; Repeated Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H55 J11 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP7310.asp (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect (2009)
Working Paper: Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7310

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP7310.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Address: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Series data maintained by ().