The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

Eva . Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz

No 7331, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.

Keywords: adverse selection; Hidden information; information gathering (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06

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