How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?
Pedro Barros (),
Joseph Clougherty () and
Jo Seldeslachts ()
No 7454, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.
Keywords: antitrust; deterrence; merger policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L40 L49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
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Journal Article: How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition? (2010)
Working Paper: How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition? (2009)
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