Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions

Ella Segev and Aner Sela

No 8949, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium of these multi-stage sequential all-pay contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants, their types, and their order on the expected highest effort.

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Sequential contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2012-04
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