Private Information and the Design of Securities

Gabrielle Demange () and Guy Laroque

CEPR Financial Markets Paper from European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG

Abstract: One often quoted reason for the incompleteness of financial markets is the fact that an informational asymmetry prevents entrepreneurs to float their company on the market. In fact, the privileged information that the owners have on their firms discourages rational financial investors and thins the market. The paper studies the validity of this argument in a model similar to Grossman-Stiglitz (1980). An entrepreneur who contemplates issuing a new security faces a trade-off between speculative gains, which arise from his privileged information, and an insurance motive, associated with the insurance provided by the stock market. We study the terms of this arbitrage as a function of the fundamentals of the economy: aggregate risk, risk tolerance, precision of the privileged information.

Keywords: Insider Trading; Security Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-10

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Related works:
Working Paper: Private Information and the Design of Securities (1992)
Journal Article: Private Information and the Design of Securities (1995)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprfm:0036

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