The Economics of Scientific Misconduct

Nicola Lacetera () and Lorenzo Zirulia

No 215, CESPRI Working Papers from CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy

Abstract: Scientific fraud is a pervasive phenomenon with deleterious consequences, as it leads to false scientific knowledge being published, therefore a¤ecting major individual and public decisions. In this paper we build a game-theoretic model of the research and publication process that ana- lyzes why scientists commit fraud and how fraud can be detected and prevented. In the model, authors are asymmetrically informed about the success of their projects, and can fraudulently manipulate their results. We show four main results. First, the types of scientific frauds that are observed are unlikely to be representative of the overall amount of malfeasance in science; also, star scientists are more likely to misbehave, but are less likely to be caught than average scientists. Second, a reduction in the costs of checking for frauds may not lead to a reduction of misconduct episodes, but rather to a change in the type of research that is performed. Third, an increase in competition between scientists may in fact reduce, and not increase, scientific misconduct. Finally, a more active role of editors in checking for misconduct does not always provide additional deterrence.

Keywords: Research and publication process; peer review; fraud. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 D82 K42 O31 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-hpe, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-sog
Date: 2008-03, Revised 2008-04
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