Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard

Jullien ; Salanié ; Salanié, Bruno ; Bernard ; François
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Jullien ; Salanié ; Salanié, Bruno ; Bernard ; François: Crest
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: François Salanié (), Bernard Salanié () and Bruno JULLIEN ()

Working Papers from Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique

Keywords: optimal; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard (2001)
Working Paper: Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard (2001)
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