First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge

Elmar Wolfstetter ()

Working Papers from Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique

Keywords: optimal; matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: First-Price Auctions when the Ranking of Valuations is Common Knowledge
Journal Article: First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge (2001)
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