A Determinação do Preço dos Bens Duráveis em Duopólio
Carlos Osório (),
Paulo Maçãs () and
João Leitão ()
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Carlos Osório: Departamento de Gestão e Economia, Universidade da Beira Interior
Paulo Maçãs: Departamento de Gestão e Economia, Universidade da Beira Interior
Working Papers de Gestão, Economia e Marketing (Management, Economics and Marketing Working Papers) from Universidade da Beira Interior, Departamento de Gestão e Economia (Portugal)
This paper aims at the comparison between Cournot and Stackelberg pricings for a durable good, assuming time as a continuous variable. It concludes that the Cournot's strategic conduct is better for the duopoly producers than the Stackelberg's leader. This conclusion, however, does not prevail for the first stage, although it does for the remaining. Whether one of the producers acts as a leader, the satellite rival will respond in such a way that the price approaches, in a very short time, the marginal cost. For the remaining stages, but the first one, irrespective of the risk level and the strategic conduct taken, Cournot's model implies a stable equilibrium, based on higher Cournot's profits than Stackelberg's profits.
Keywords: Duopoly; Durable; Price; Profit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: A Determinação do Preço dos Bens Duráveis em Duopólio (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:csh:wpecon:6/2001
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