A Gibbad-Satterthwaite Theorem for Public Good Economies

Diego Moreno () and María José Moscoso

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study the properties of mechanisms for deciding upon the provision of public goods when the feasible set is exogenously given (by financial and/or technological constraints), and individuals' preferences are represented by continuous, increasing and concave utility functions, and we establish a result analog to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: strategy-proof mechanisms are dictatorial. Further, efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms are strongly dictatorial (i.e., maximize the dictator's welfare on the entire feasible set.)

Date: 2001-01
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://docubib.uc3m.es/WORKINGPAPERS/WE/we014912.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we014912

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().