ON THE GENERIC STRATEGIC STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IF VOTING IS COSTLY

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: 2002-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly (2003)
Journal Article: On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we025620

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