SOME RESULTS ON STRATEGIC VOTING AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION WITH MULTIDIMENSIONAL POLICY SPACE

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. We first show, via an example, that the assumption of quasi-concavity of the utility function is not sufficient to obtain the result that only the extreme parties get votes, contrary to the unidimensional case. We, then, study two cases in which stronger assumptions on voters' preferences assure that voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2002-11
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://docubib.uc3m.es/WORKINGPAPERS/WE/we025721.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we025721

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().