EXTREME VOTING UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters' preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm and nep-pol
Date: 2005-05
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Related works:
Working Paper: Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case (2005)
Journal Article: Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we053421

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