INFORMATION TRANSMISSION IN COALITIONAL VOTING GAMES

Roberto Serrano () and Rajiv Vohra ()

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra [4] and the core proposed by Myerson [11] as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-ict
Date: 2005-10
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005)
Working Paper: Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2005)
Working Paper: Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games (2004)
Journal Article: Information transmission in coalitional voting games (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we055726

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