A COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE PREKERNEL AND THE PREKERNEL

Roberto Serrano () and Ken-Ichi Shimomura ()

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is approximated by the set of equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of bargaining at random against any other player. In the cooperative analysis, we characterize the average prekernel as the unique solution that satisfies a set of Nash-like axioms for two-person games, and versions of average consistency and its converse for multilateral settings

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-10
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Journal Article: A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel (2006)
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