MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AS A DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING CORRELATED DISTRIBUTIONS

Anirban Kar (), Indrajit Ray () and Roberto Serrano ()

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity condition and therefore can not be fully implemented in Nash equilibrium

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions (2005)
Working Paper: Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions (2005)
Working Paper: Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we057238

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