On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium

Ezra Einy (), Ori Haimanko (), Diego Moreno () and Benyamin Shitovitz ()

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We show that even in very simple oligopolies with differential information a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. However, we find sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are allowed.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-mic
Date: 2007-03

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we070603

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