College admissions and the role of information: an experimental study

Joana Vaz Pais (), Ágnes Pintér () and Róbert Ferenc Veszteg ()

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We analyze two well-known matching mechanisms—the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanisms—in the experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our results suggest that—in line with the theory—in the college admissions model the Gale-Shapley mechanism outperforms the TTC mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as the TTC mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation. In addition, we find that information has an important effect on truthful behavior and stability. Nevertheless, regarding efficiency, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is less sensitive to the amount of information participants hold.

Keywords: Experiments; Information; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-lab
Date: Written 2008-01
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