Multiple openings of forward markets: experimental evidence

José Luis Ferreira (), Praveen Kujal () and Stephen Rassenti

Economics Working Papers from Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía

Abstract: We test the strategic motive to sell forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly environments with multiple forward markets. Using random matching, we test two versions of forward markets with finite (Allaz and Vila, 1993) and indefinite number of periods. We find that the results for the Allaz and Vila (1993) model are remarkably close to the predicted theoretical results for both duopolies and quadropolies. We then test a version of the model to allow for indefinitely many periods. There are multiple equilibria in this theoretical model, including both the competitive and collusive outcomes. We find that the initial "collusive hypothesis" is not ratified, and that outcomes are nearly competitive. Sales take place mostly in the first few openings of futures markets. Again, these results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2010-10
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