Assessing Strategic Risk

Robert J. Aumann and Jacques H. Dreze

No 2005020, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: In recent decades, the concept of subjective probability has been increasingly applied to an adversaryÕs choices in strategic games. A careful examination reveals that the standard construction of subjective probabilities does not apply in this context. We show how the difficulty may be overcome by means of a different construction, and provide an axiomatic fondation for it.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
Date: Written
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2005-20.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Assessing Strategic Risk (2004)
Working Paper: Assessing strategic risk (2005)
Journal Article: Assessing Strategic Risk (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005020

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques
Address: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Anne DAVISTER ().