Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support

Olivier Bochet () and Francois Paul Maniquet ()

No 2006043, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: A social choice correspondence (SCC) is virtually implementable if it is e-close (in the probability simplex) to some (exactly) implementable correspondence. Abreu and Sen (1991) proved that, without restriction on the set of alternatives receiving strictly positive probability at equilibrium, every SCC is virtually implementable in Nash Equilibrium. We study virtual implementation when the supports of equilibrium lotteries are restricted. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition, imposing joint restrictions on SCCs and admissible supports. Then, we discuss how to construct supports. Finally, we study virtual implementation when the support is restricted to the efficient or individually rational alternatives.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: Written
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2006-43.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006043

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques
Address: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Anne DAVISTER ().