Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

Marco Marinucci ()

No 2008016, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partnersÕ effort is not obervable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JVÕs profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements

Keywords: Joint ventures; strategic alliances; ownership structure; asymmetries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
Date: 2008-06-18

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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners (2008)
Working Paper: Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners (2008)
Working Paper: Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners (2008)
Journal Article: Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2008016

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