The TV news scheduling game when the newscasterÕs face matters

Jean Gabszewicz (), Didier Laussel () and SONNAC Nathalie

No 2008020, Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) from Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques

Abstract: The present note first provides an alternative formulation of the Cancian, Bills and Bergstršm (1995) - problem which discards the non-existence difficulty and consequently allows to consider some extensions of the TV-newscast scheduling game. The extension we consider consists in assuming that viewersÕ preferences between the competing channels do not depend only on the timing of their broadcast, but also on some other characteristics, like the content of the show or the identity of the newscaster. Then we identify a sufficient condition on the dispersion of these preferences over the viewersÕ population guaranteeing the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. It turns out that, at this equilibrium, both networks broadcast their news at the same instant.

Keywords: advertising; newspaper quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L15 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul
Date: 2008-06-18

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvec:2008020

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