Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries

Antonio Estache, Ana Goicoechea and Lourdes Trujillo ()

No 07/07, City University Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, City University, London

Abstract: This paper shows empirically that “privatization” in the energy, telecommunications and water sectors, and the introduction of independent regulators in those sectors, have not always had the expected effects on access, affordability or quality of services. It also shows that corruption leads to adjustments in the quantity, quality, and price of services consistent with the profit-maximizing behaviour that one would expect from monopolies in the sector. Finally, our results suggest that privatization and the introduction of independent regulators have, at best, only partial effects on the consequences of corruption for access, affordability and quality of utilities services.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-reg
Date: 2007-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries (2006)
Journal Article: Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cty:dpaper:0707

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