Financial Incentives in Academia: Research versus Development

Albert Banal-Estanol () and Ines Macho-Stadler ()

No 07/09, City University Economics Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, City University, London

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of monetary rewards on the pattern of research. We build a simple repeated model of a researcher capable to obtain innovative ideas. We analyse how the legal environment affects the allocation of researcher’s time between research and development. Although technology transfer objectives reduce the time spent in research, they might also induce researchers to conduct research that is more basic in nature, contrary to what the “skewing problem” would presage. We also show that our results hold even if development delays publication.

Keywords: Faculty behaviour; basic versus applied research; choice of projects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04
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Working Paper: Financial Incentives in Academia: Research versus Development (2007)
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