Endogenous Lobbying

Leonardo Felli () and Antonio Merlo ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An "extremist" candidate is elected and implements a "centrist" policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous.

Keywords: LOBBYING; ELECTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9188/RR00-04.PDF (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2000)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2004)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2003)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Lobbying
Journal Article: Endogenous Lobbying (2006)
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