Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining

Hülya K. K. Eraslan and Antonio Merlo ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: In this paper we consider multilateral stochastic bargaining models with general agreement rules. For n-player games where in each period a player is randomly selected to allocate a stochastic level of surplus and q<=n players have to agree on a proposal to induce its acceptance, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and establish their existence. We show that for agreement rules other than the unanimity rule, the equilibrium payoffs need not be unique. Furthermore, even when the equilibrium is unique, it need not be efficient.

Keywords: NONCOOPERATIVE BARGAINING; VOTING RULES; STOCHASTIC GAMES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Journal Article: Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining (2002)
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