A Nail-Biting Election

Steven J. Brams and P. C. Fishburn

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: In the first competitive election for President of the Social Choice and Welfare Society, the (official) approval-voting winner differed from the (hypothetical) Borda count winner, who was also the Condorcet winner. But because the election was essentially a toss-up, it is impossible to say who should have won. The election forCouncil was more true to form of other professional-society elections, with the winners identical, and even their rankings almost duplicative, under both voting systems.

Keywords: ELECTION; SOCIAL CHOICE; APPROVAL VOTING; BORDA COUNT; CONDORCET CANDIDATE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Journal Article: A nail-biting election (2001)
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