Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, But Does That Matter?

Walter Bossert (), Steven J. Brams and D. M. Kilgour

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the alpha-core and beta-core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

Keywords: COOPERATIVE GAME; NON-COOPERATIVE GAME; TRUEL; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; CORE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000

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Related works:
Working Paper: Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? (2000)
Working Paper: Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? (2000)
Journal Article: Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? (2002)
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