Learning, Quantal Response Equilibrium and Equilibrium in Beliefs

Y. Nyarko

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: This paper makes two points. First, the modeling used in the rational (or Bayesian) learning literature can be generalized to handle the repeated shocks to preferences inherent and implicit in models of quantal response equilibria (QRE). In particular, we note that the Bayesian model and the QRE model are really not as different as often portrayed in the literature. Second, Bayesian learning under appropriate conditions therefore leads to a QRE.

Keywords: QUANTAL RESPONSE EQUILIBRIUM; BAYESIAN LEARNING; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 D81 D82 D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2001

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