Advice and Behavior in Intergenerational Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Approach

A. Shotter and Barry Sopher ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: In the real world, when people play games, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice has a dramatic impact on the behavior of subjects. It diminishes the variance of offers made over time, lowers their mean, and causes Receivers to reject low offers with higher probability. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers.

JEL-codes: C91 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9187/RR01-04.PDF (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvs:starer:01-04

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Address: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Anne Stubing ().