Why Do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops?

Benoit, J-P. and Juan Dubra ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: Policemen are known to support colleagues who are the subject of criminal investigations. While we might expect guilty officers to defend each other, why do law-abiding policemen defend those who have broken the law? We investigate under what conditions it is in the interest of a group to defend its "bad" members.

Keywords: CORRUPTION; VOTING; WALL OF SILENCE; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2003
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops? (2004)
Journal Article: WHY DO GOOD COPS DEFEND BAD COPS? (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvs:starer:03-01

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