Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes

Steven J. Brams and M. Remzi Sanver ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Keywords: APPROVAL VOTING; ELECTIONS; CONDORCET WINNER/LOSER; NASH EQUILIBRIUM. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2003
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