Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach

Steven J. Brams and M.S. Kulikov

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: One of the most elusive ingredients in the success of a deal is what deal makers euphemistically refer to as "Social issues" - how power, position, and status will be allocated among the merging companies' executives. A failure to resolve these issues often leads to the destruction of shareholder wealth and portrayal of top executives as petty corporates chieftains, unable to subordinate their selfish interests to the goal of promoting shareholder well-being.

Keywords: MERGERS; EFFICIENCY; EQUITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

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