Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity

Steven J. Brams and P.C. Fishburn

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: This paper focuses on the fair division of a set of indivisible items between two people when both have the same linear preference order on the items but may have different preferences over subsets of items. Surprisingly, divisions that are envy-free, Pareto-optimal, and ensure that the less well-off person does as well as possible (i.e., are equitable) can often be achived. Preferences between subsets are assumed to satisfy axioms of qualitative probability without implying the existence of additive utilities, which is treated as a special case.

Keywords: EQUITY; OPTIMIZATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9381/RR98-20.PDF (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvs:starer:98-20

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Address: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Anne Stubing ().