Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts

Alberto Bisin () and Danilo Guaitoli ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard (hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium is determined by the interaction of financial intermediaries. The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is that intermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: the agents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot be monitored ( or are not contractible upon).

Keywords: EFFICIENCY; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D61 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Working Paper: Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts (1998)
Working Paper: Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts (1998)
Journal Article: Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvs:starer:98-24

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