Voting Procedures

Steven J. Brams () and Peter Fishburn

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Keywords: voting; social choice; manipulability; Condorcet criterion; proportional representation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Chapter: Voting procedures (2002)
Chapter: Voting procedures (1994)
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