Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers

Douglas Gale ()

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Keywords: monotone games; positive spillovers; efficiency; subgame perfect equilibrium; voluntary contribution games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers (2001)
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