Competitive Fair Division

Steven J. Brams and D.M. Kilgour

Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

Abstract: The analysis is developed in the context of the "housemates problem," in which the rent for a house (the bad) must be apportioned among several housemates, each of whom is entitled to receive one room (the good). Each housemate is assumed to have the same endowment, so the auction of rooms is a "relativized" one--only relative, not absolute, bids for each room matter. Other applications of the Gap Procedure, in which player endowments and entitlements may be different, or the procedure may be carried out in rounds, are discussed.

Keywords: EFFICIENCY; AUCTIONS; BIDDING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/9186/RR99-05.PDF (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Competitive Fair Division (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cvs:starer:99-05

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University
Address: C.V. Starr Center, Department of Economics, New York University, 19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10012
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Anne Stubing ().