Contract-Theoretic Approaches to Wages and Displacement

Wouter J. den Haan, Garey Ramey and Joel Watson ()
Additional contact information
Wouter J. den Haan: Dept. Economics, UCLA, San Diego
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Wouter Denhaan ()

No 1216, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing contracting imperfections in long-term employment relationships. We focus chiefly on limited enforceability and limited worker liquidity. Inefficient severance of employment relationships, payment of efficiency wages, the relative responses of wages and employment to business cycle shocks, and the propagation of these shocks are linked to the nature of contracting imperfections.

Date: 1999-04
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d12a/d1216.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Contract-Theoretic Approaches to Wages and Displacement (1999)
Working Paper: Contract-Theoretic Approaches to Wages and Displacement (1999)
Working Paper: Contract-Theoretic Approaches to Wages and Displacement (1999)
Journal Article: Contract-theoretic approaches to wages and displacement (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1216

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University
Address: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Glena Ames ().