On Local and Network Games

Thomas Quint () and Martin Shubik
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Thomas Quint: University of Nevada, Reno

No 1414, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: The knowledge constraints and transactions costs imposed by geographical distance, network connections and time conspire to justify local behavior as a good approximation for global rationality. We consider a class of games to illustrate this relationship and raise some questions as to what constitutes a satisfactory solution concept.

Keywords: Local games; Network games; Advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D89 M39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-gth and nep-ure
Date: 2003-05
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Working Paper: On Local and Network Games (2004)
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