Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry

Martin Shubik and Eric Smith
Additional contact information
Eric Smith: Santa Fe Institute

No 1419, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: We introduce and justify a taxonomy for the structure of markets and minimal institutions which appear in constructing minimally complex trading structures to perform the functions of price formation, settlement and payments. Each structure is presented as a playable strategic market game and is examined for its efficiency, the number of degrees of freedom and the symmetry properties of the structure.

Keywords: Strategic market games; Clearinghouses; Credit evaluation; Default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 G10 G20 L10 D40 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin, nep-gth and nep-ind
Date: 2003-05

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Related works:
Working Paper: Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry (2004)
Journal Article: Structure, Clearinghouses and Symmetry (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1419

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