Aggregation of Expert Opinions

Dino Gerardi (), Richard McLean and Andrew Postlewaite ()
Additional contact information
Dino Gerardi: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/faculty/gerardi.htm
Richard McLean: Rutgers University

No 1503, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation, Yale University

Abstract: Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We show how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken, and show that only slight distortions will be necessary when agents are "informationally small." We further show that as the number of informed agents becomes large the necessary distortion goes to zero. We argue that the particular mechanisms analyzed are substantially less demanding informationally than those typically employed in implementation and virtual implementation. In particular, the equilibria we analyze are "conditionally" dominant strategy in a precise sense. Further, the mechanisms are immune to manipulation by small groups of agents.

Keywords: Information Aggregation; Mechanism Design; Incomplete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
Date: 2005-04
Note: CFP 1239.
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior (March 2009), 65(2): 339-371

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Related works:
Working Paper: Aggregation of Expert Opinions (2005)
Journal Article: Aggregation of expert opinions (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1503

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